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Abstract
This paper examines simultaneous search behavior of a ﬁrm for the highest selling
price and the lowest wage rate. It begins by formulating simultaneous search problem
of a competitive ﬁrm, and then characterizes the optimal search. The comparative
static results and some welfare implications follow. In the end, for a possible exten-
sion, simultaneous search problem of a monopolist is considered.
Keywords: simultaneous search, competitive ﬁrm, ﬁxed-sample-size search
1 Introduction
Through his seminal article in 1961, Stigler (1961) called attentions of the profession to
studies on individual behavior of search. By now, the literature has become huge, diverting
itself in several directions. Although it is potentially extendable to other contexts, most
models on personal search have been originally proposed as either consumer search or job
search. Few have focused on a ﬁrm’s search. This paper studies a ﬁrm’s search.
Consumer search and job search are the two most active areas of research on individual
search. Consumer search is often seen as search for the lowest price while job search is seen
as search for the highest price. So, these are in some sense two extreme cases. As discussed
below, a ﬁrm’s search contains both aspects. Furthermore, it turns out shortly that a ﬁrm’s
search behavior is diﬀerent from a consumer’s, even though both of them search for lower
prices.
There has been several diﬀerent search strategies that searchers may take. They in-
clude sequential strategy, ﬁxed-sample-size (fss) strategy, and their hybrid, optimal search
strategy, among others.1 Every one of these has its own advantage. So, it is not possible to
∗E-mail address: nwakutsu@dokkyo.ac.jp
1For instance, see Rothschild (1974) and Weitzman (1971) for sequential search, Manning and Morgan
(1982) and Morgan (1983) for fss search and Morgan and Manning (1985) and Chade and Smith (2006)
for optimal search.
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claim in general which dominates which search rules.2 This paper restricts its attention to
fss search in which a searcher determines how much to search before she starts searching.
The advantage of this search rule includes that a searcher may collect information more
quickly. Note, however, that our attention to this search strategy does not means that we
insist that ﬁrms follow this search rule more than others. No doubt there are some cases
in which another rule ﬁts better.
The model of concern in this paper is as follows. Consider a ﬁrm that produces a
single commodity y by using inputs x ∈ Rl where Rl is an l-dimensional real space with
some integer l ≥ 1. Unlike standard ﬁrm models, suppose that there are several consumer
markets for commodity y and several factor markets for some input xi. Moreover, suppose
that each market is characterized by a parameter and that the ﬁrm knows the distributions
of the parameter values but is ignorant of the exact location of each value. That is, it
knows existing market types and the frequencies, but cannot tell which market is of which
type. The ﬁrm, however, can “visit” any of those markets at some cost and see its complete
characteristics. To be more speciﬁc, by canvassing a consumer market for commodity y
(or a factor market for input xi), he can learn the selling price (or the wage rate) in that
market.
In such a setup, a ﬁrm now involves two problems to solve for his ultimate purpose of
proﬁt maximization: a conventional problem on production and an additional problem on
search. Here, not only how many units of x and y to use and produce, but also where to
buy xi and where to sell y come into consideration.
The objective in this paper is to formally formulate a ﬁrm’s problem of search in this
setup and to examine an optimal search behavior.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 formally constructs a ﬁrm’s problem of si-
multaneous fss search in some simpliﬁed setting. In section 3, we characterize an optimal
simultaneous search by solving the ﬁrm problem. Sections 4 and 5 consider comparative
statics and production. In section 6, some welfare implications of the ﬁrm’s search is
discussed. To conclude, section 7 remarks some extensions and limitations of our model.
2 Firm’s Simultaneous Search Problem
The model of concern in this paper is based on the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. A ﬁrm, whose technology is represented by a function ζ : R2 → R, pro-
duces a commodity y by using x = (x1, x2) as inputs.
2For more discussion on this matter, see for example Morgan and Manning (1985).
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Assumption 2. There is a set of competitive consumer markets for commodity y, oﬀering
various selling prices p as a whole.
Assumption 3. There is a set of competitive factor markets for input x1, oﬀering various
input prices w1 as a whole.
Assumption 4. There is only one factor market for input x2, which is competitive and
oﬀers an input price w2.
Assumption 5. The distributions of selling prices for y and input prices for x1 are known,
but the exact location of any particular price is not except those of the lowest selling price
and the highest input price.
Assumption 6. The ﬁrm learns the selling price in a consumer market at cost cλ and the
input price in a factor market for input x1 at cost cθ.
Assumptions 1–6 give a simple setup for our analysis on a ﬁrm’s simultaneous search
behavior. Of course, we can obtain more general setups under weaker assumptions. For
example, search can involve more than three prices; neither consumer markets nor factor
markets are necessarily competitive; or price locations can be completely uncertain at the
outset. Some of those cases will be discussed later.
Before proceeding, it is better for concreteness to propose a possible interpretation of
this economy. The consumer markets consist of one “domestic” and many other “foreign”
markets. The ﬁrm under consideration is an incumbent of this domestic market. The
selling price he undergoes in this domestic market is very low, so he wants to “export”
his product to a more proﬁtable market. He knows the ranges of selling prices oﬀered in
foreign markets, but cannot tell which price belongs to which market. Fortunately, such
information is obtainable through “marketing research” whose cost is cλ for each market.
While the ﬁrm exports his product to a foreign market, transportation cost becomes
his concern. If x1 is an input for physical distribution of commodity y, then the input price
for x1 is the “distribution cost.” Suppose that several companies oﬀer this distribution
service x1 at diﬀerent prices. The ﬁrm under consideration knows one of the companies.
Unfortunately, this company is inferior in exporting y and charges the highest price among
all distribution ﬁrms, since it is specialized to domestic transportation. Once again, he
knows the distribution of asking prices for this service, but is ignorant of the exact loca-
tions except one. In exchange of cθ per company, he can learn the asking prices of other
companies. Since it improves its physical distribution system, the ﬁrm’s search for the
lowest input price may be considered as “cost-reducing process R&D”.
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The following notations are used throughout the paper. The lowest selling price for
commodity y is written by λp0. The highest factor price for input x1 is written by θw0.
With these, the associated price dispersions for commodity y and input x1 are denoted
by [λp0, λp0] and [θw0, θw0]. By construction, we let λ ≥ 1 with λ = 1 and let θ ≤ 1
with θ = 1 where λ ∈ [λ, λ] and θ ∈ [θ, θ]. We call p0 and w0 as “reference prices” while λ
and θ as a “premium” or a “discount factor”, respectively.
Furthermore, the underlying cumulative distribution functions (cdf) for premium λ and
discount factor θ are written as F and G, respectively. Together with p0 and w0, they
also provide the price distributions for commodity y and input x1. The probability density
functions (pdf) of F and G are given in the associated lower-case letters, f and g.
Now we start modeling a ﬁrm’s simultaneous search problem in this setting. Here, the
ﬁrm’s problem consists of two components: production and search. That is, he decides not
only how many units of x and y to use and to produce, but also from which market to
buy x1 and to which market to sell y in order to maximize his expected proﬁt. We consider
a two-stage setup, where he conducts searches in stage 1 and begins production in stage 2.
From the ﬁrm’s viewpoint, λ and θ are random variables with known probabilities. So,
the search problem simpliﬁes into a problem of choosing the numbers of observations nλ
and nθ, which we refer to as intensities of search.
Begin by stage 2. The ﬁrm’s problem in stage 2 is a conventional production problem.
That is, given a selling price λp0 and input prices θw0 and w2, it solves
max
y,x1,x2
λp0y − θw0x1 − w2x2
subject to y = ζ(x1, x2).
The objective function λp0y − θw0x1 − w2x2 is the direct proﬁt.3 The solution to this
second-stage problem is a set of supply and factor demand functions:
y∗(λp0, θw0, w2),
x∗i (λp0, θw0, w2) i = 1, 2.
Substituting these into the direct proﬁt gives the indirect proﬁt function
π(λp0, θw0, w2) = λp0y
∗(λp0, θw0, w2)− θw0x∗1(λp0, θw0, w2)− w2x∗2(λp0, θw0, w2).
Note the basic properties of the indirect proﬁt function that π is nondecreasing in selling
price λp0 and nonincreasing in input prices θw0 and w2.
3Please note that the proﬁt does not include either nλcλ or nθcθ. It is because those costs are already
sunk.
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Go to stage 1. First, consider a situation after search. By conducting search of in-
tensity n = (nλ, nθ), the ﬁrm observes nλ premiums, λ1, · · · , λnλ , and nθ discount factors,
θ1, · · · , θnθ . For each pair of (λi, θj), he computes the direct proﬁt and then solves the max-
imization problem to obtain the indirect proﬁt function π(λip0, θjw0, w2). Here, i and j are
integers with 1 ≤ i ≤ nλ and 1 ≤ j ≤ nθ. In sum, he has nλnθ proﬁt functions to compare.
For his purpose of proﬁt maximization, it is clear that he prefers λm and θm deﬁned by
λm = max {λ1, . . . , λnλ} (1)
θm = min {θ1, . . . , θnθ}. (2)
since π(λmp0, θmw0, w2) ≥ π(λip0, θjw0, w2) for any i and j.
Before going to search, he can compute this π for each pair of (λm, θm) ∈ [λ, λ]× [θ, θ].
The pdf of λm, which is the maximum of a sample of nλ independent observations from an
identical population with the pdf f , is
f ∗(λm|nλ) = nλ[F (λm)]nλ−1f(λm), nλ ≥ 1. (3)
The pdf of θm, which is the minimum of a sample of nθ independent observations from an
identical population with the pdf g, is
g∗(θm|nθ) = nθ[1−G(θm)]nθ−1g(θm), nθ ≥ 1. (4)
Let F ∗ and G∗ be the corresponding cdf’s. Let n = (nλ, nθ) and α = (cλ, cθ, p0, w0, w2).
Then the ﬁrm’s expected direct search proﬁt net of search costs equals
H(n;α) = E[π(λmp0, θmw0, w2)|n]− nλcλ − nθcθ (5)
where E stands for the expectation taken with respect to distributions F ∗ and G∗:
E[π(λmp0, θmw0, w2)|n] =
∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
π(λmp0, θmw0, w2)f
∗(λm|nλ)g∗(θm|nθ) dλm dθm. (6)
E[π(·)|n] is termed as the expected indirect proﬁt. The ﬁrm’s search problem is to select
intensity n so at to maximize the expected direct search proﬁt net of search cost H(n;α)
in (5).4
4Note that H(n) in (5) is well-deﬁned under the stated assumptions. In particular, by Assumptions 5
the ﬁrm knows the exact locations of λ and θ at the outset. So, even if nλ=0 and/or nθ = 0, he
has y∗(λp0, θw0, w2) and x∗i (λp0, θw0, w2) and obtains pi(λp0, θw0, w2). It is obvious for other nonnega-
tive integers. Hence H(n) is well-deﬁned. One may want to weaken this assumption by imposing complete
ignorance of price locations. In that case, some adjustments in deﬁning f∗ and g∗ are necessary for a
well-deﬁned H(n). For necessary adjustments that results in a well-deﬁned H(n) (as a Lebesgue-Stieltjes
integral), see Manning and Morgan (1982), pp.205-6.
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3 The Solution of Firm’s Problem
This section characterizes an optimal simultaneous search of this ﬁrm, by solving the prob-
lem set above. Before doing so, however, let us introduce some additional assumptions on
technical grounds.
The ﬁrst one is about intensity n. The ﬁrm’s search problem is to select n so as to
attain a maximized H(n) in (5). Precisely speaking, this is an integer-valued problem. An
optimal n, written as n∗, belongs to Z2+, where Z+ is a set of nonnegative integers. However,
it becomes analytically more convenient if n can be treated as continuous variables. For
this reason, we set the following assumption.
Assumption 7. n is a nonnegative two-dimensional real.
Under this additional assumption, the ﬁrm’s simultaneous search problem now becomes
to choose n ∈ R2+ that maximizes (5).5
The interior solutions may be of particular interest. To this end, let production func-
tion ζ, indirect proﬁt function π and expected direct search proﬁt net of search cost H
satisfy the following assumptions.
Assumption 8. Let xi = x
∗
i (λp0, θw0, w2) for i = 1, 2. Then, ζ is diﬀerentiable in x and
satisﬁes
lim
xi→xi
∂ζ(x)
∂xi
= +∞, i = 1, 2.
Assumption 9. π(λmp0, θmw0, w2) is diﬀerentiable in λmp0, θmw0 and w2.
Assumption 10. H(n;α) is twice diﬀerentiable in n and α.
Assumption 8 makes productions at x ∈ (x1,∞)×(x2,∞) essential and ensures positive
search intensities. Assumptions 8 and 9 together make calculus approach relevant to this
problem.
The following two propositions characterize the proﬁt-maximizing search intensity of
the ﬁrm under the stated assumptions.
Proposition 1. An optimal search intensity n∗ = (n∗λ, n
∗
θ) satisfies∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
π(λmp0, θmw0, w2)
∂f ∗(λm|nλ)
∂nλ
g∗(θm|nθ) dλm dθm = cλ (7)
5This is convention in the profession on this subject. One justiﬁcation for it is that errors resulting
from this assumption are not great in the sense that two n∗’s, one from real-valued problem and one from
original, diﬀer by less than 1 if H is strictly concave. See Manning and Morgan (1982), p.206.
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and ∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
π(λmp0, θmw0, w2)f
∗(λm|nλ)∂g
∗(θm|nθ)
∂nθ
dλm dθm = cθ. (8)
Proof. For the interior solution, necessarily DH = 0 holds. (7) and (8) are just this
rearranged.
Proposition 1 states that the optimal intensity of search equates the marginal beneﬁt of
search with its marginal cost. The LHS of (7) is ∂E[π|nλ, nθ]/∂nλ, meaning the marginal
expected proﬁt resulting from additional increment of search for λ. The RHS is its cor-
responding cost. Similarly, the LHS of (8), ∂E[π|nλ, nθ]/∂nθ gives the marginal expected
after-search proﬁt arising from additional search for θ. The RHS is its cost.
Proposition 2. (7) and (8) represent a local optimal search intensity if, for n = n∗,[∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
π(λmp0, θmw0, w2)
∂2f ∗(λm|nλ)
∂nλ2
g∗(θm|nθ) dλm dθm
]
·
[∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
π(λmp0, θmw0, w2)f
∗(λm|nλ)∂
2g∗(θm|nθ)
∂nθ2
dλm dθm
]
>
[∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
π(λmp0, θmw0, w2)
∂f ∗(λm|nλ)
∂nλ
∂g∗(θm|nθ)
∂nθ
dλm dθm
]2
. (9)
Further, if (9) holds for all n ∈ R2+, then (7) and (8) represent global optimum.
Proof. In Appendix 1.
The condition that (9) imposes on the optimal search is that, in some neighborhood
of n∗, “own eﬀects” on marginal beneﬁts of search must outweigh their “cross eﬀects”.
We cannot determine whether the inequality holds in general. From Corollaries 5 and 6
in Appendix 2, we know that the LHS of (9) is positive and the RHS is nonnegative under
Assumption 8. Beyond that, more speciﬁc formula for f and g are necessary.
4 Comparative Statics
The ﬁrm’s problem in our setting involves two stages: stage of search and stage of pro-
duction. Of particular interest is how a ﬁrm’s search behavior changes if the environment
of search or the environment of second-stage production changes. These are problems
concerning comparative statistics.
Suppose that in some neighborhood of n∗, (9) holds. Then, by Proposition 2, a (locally)
optimal search intensity exists. Moreover, since this implies that D2H (the Hessian of H)
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is nonzero, (in principle) we can locally solve implicit relations (7) and (8) for the optimal n
as functions of parameters. That is, with α = (cλ, cθ, p0, w0, w2)
n∗λ = n
∗
λ(α) (10)
n∗θ = n
∗
θ(α). (11)
Substituting these into (5) provides the ﬁrm’s expected indirect search proﬁt net of search
costs
ϕ(α) = H(n∗(α);α) = E[π(λmp0, θmw0, w2)|n∗(α)]− n∗λ(α)cλ − n∗θ(α)cθ. (12)
In what follows, we examine the eﬀect of changes in parameter α on the optimal search
intensity n∗. The meaning of changes in cλ, cθ and w2 is clear. An increase in p0 means
that the distribution of selling prices is scaled up by a constant proportion. Of course, this
increases both of the mean and variance. So, it is a special kind of increasing risk. The
implication of an increase in w0 is similar.
Proposition 3. Suppose that (9) holds for n = n∗. Then,
(i) the optimal search intensity for the highest selling discount factor λm is nondecreasing
with scale changes in the distribution of selling prices. That is,
∂n∗λ
∂p0
≥ 0. (13)
(ii) The optimal search intensity for the lowest discount factor θm of input x1 is indepen-
dent of scale changes in the distribution of selling prices p0. That is,
∂n∗θ
∂p0
= 0. (14)
(iii) The optimal search intensity for the highest selling discount factor λm is independent
of scale changes in the distribution of discount factors of input x1. That is,
∂n∗λ
∂w0
= 0. (15)
(iv) The optimal search intensity for the lowest discount factor θm of input x1 is nonde-
creasing with scale changes in the distribution of discount factors of input x1. That
is,
∂n∗θ
∂w0
≥ 0. (16)
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(v) The optimal search intensity for the highest selling discount factor λm is independent
of changes in prices of input x2. That is,
∂n∗λ
∂w2
= 0. (17)
(vi) The optimal search intensity for the lowest discount factor θm of input x1 is indepen-
dent of changes in prices of input x2. That is,
∂n∗θ
∂w2
= 0. (18)
(vii) An increase in search cost for the highest selling discount factor decreases the optimal
amount of search for the highest selling discount factor λm. That is,
∂n∗λ
∂cλ
< 0. (19)
(viii) An increase in search cost for the lowest discount factor of input x1 decreases the
optimal amount of search for the lowest discount factor θm of input x1. That is,
∂n∗θ
∂cθ
< 0. (20)
(ix) The optimal search intensity for the highest selling discount factor λm is independent
of changes in search costs for the lowest discount factor of input x1. That is,
∂n∗λ
∂cθ
= 0. (21)
(x) The optimal search intensity for the lowest discount factor θm of input x1 is indepen-
dent of changes in search costs for the highest selling discount factor. That is,
∂n∗θ
∂cλ
= 0. (22)
Proof. In Appendix 1.
Parts (vii) and (viii) of Proposition 3 are nothing but “the law of demand” for ﬁrm’s
search by viewing “price information” as one particular good. Parts (i) and (iv) say that
increased risk in the distributions of selling prices and input prices raises the associated op-
timal search level. The rest of the proposition shows insensitivity of ﬁrm’s search behaviors
to the other parameters.
Note that in consumer search, an increase in the list price of a non-searched-for com-
modity will increase the optimal amount of search for a searched-for-commodity if the two
commodities are substitutes (Manning and Morgan, 1982, p.210). So, the insensitivity of
ﬁrm’s search in part (vi) shows a diﬀerence in search behavior between sellers and buyers
even though both of them seek lower prices.
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5 Expected Production in Search Economy
In this section, we examine the beneﬁt of search to a ﬁrm’s expected production in this
search economy.
Hotelling’s lemma tells us how to obtain the supply function y∗(·) and the factor demand
function x∗i (·) from a proﬁt function π(·), given a commodity price p and an input price wi.
Without search, it is
∂π(p, wi)
∂p
= y∗(p, wi),
−∂π(p, wi)
∂xi
= x∗i (p, wi).
The counterpart of this derivative property in our setup is
∂ϕ(p0, w0, w2)
∂p0
=
∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
λmy
∗(λmp0, θmw0, w2)f ∗(λm|nλ)g∗(θm|nθ) dλm dθm,
−∂ϕ(p0, w0, w2)
∂w0
=
∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
θmx
∗
1(λmp0, θmw0, w2)f
∗(λm|nλ)g∗(θm|nθ) dλm dθm,
−∂ϕ(p0, w0, w2)
∂w2
=
∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
x∗2(λmp0, θmw0, w2)f
∗(λm|nλ)g∗(θm|nθ) dλm dθm.
Given a reference price p0, a reference input price w0 and an input price w2, the expressions
in the RHS are interpreted as the expected supply and factor demand functions. It says
that, for a non-searched-for commodity such as input x2, taking expectation of the factor
demand function x∗2(·) delivers the expected factor demand function, but this does not
apply for searched-for commodities. To obtain the expected supply function, the supply
function y∗(·) must be weighted by its searched-for premium λm while its expectation being
taken. Similarly, to represent the expected factor demand function, the factor demand
function x∗1(·) has to be weighted by its searched-for discount factor θm while its expectation
being taken.
The next proposition describes a relationship between optimal search and optimal ex-
pected production.
Proposition 4. Suppose that (9) holds. Then, search brings positive marginal benefit to
expected production. That is, the expected marginal production benefit of search is positive.
Proof. For the proof, it suﬃces to show∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
λmy
∗(λmp0, θmw0, w2)
∂f ∗(λm|n∗λ)
∂nλ
g∗(θm|n∗θ) dλm dθm > 0, (23)
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∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
θmx
∗
1(λmp0, θmw0, w2)f
∗(λm|n∗λ)
∂g∗(θm|n∗θ)
∂nθ
dλm dθm > 0.
These follow instantly from the Envelope Theorem, and Corollaries 3 and 4. For ex-
ample, see (23). By the optimality of the supply function y∗(·), the Envelope Theorem
gives ∂(λmp0y
∗)
∂λm
= p0y
∗ that is positive under Assumption 8. Corollary 3 in Appendix 2 then
implies (23). The other claim can be established in a similar manner.
Production does not begin until search is complete. Furthermore, production utilizes
all the ﬁndings obtained through search. Proposition 4 reﬂects this sequence of the ﬁrm’s
move. Note ∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
y∗(λmp0, θmw0, w2)
∂f ∗(λm|n∗λ)
∂nλ
g∗(θm|n∗θ) dλm dθm = 0, (24)
∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
x∗1(λmp0, θmw0, w2)f
∗(λm|n∗λ)
∂g∗(θm|n∗θ)
∂nθ
dλm dθm = 0.
These contrasts suggest why simply taking the expectation of y∗(·) and x∗1(·) is not enough
to represent the expected supply and factor demand functions.
6 Some Welfare Implications
This section considers some welfare implications of simultaneous search. Speciﬁcally, we
characterize welfare-maximizing simultaneous search and then ﬁgure out the following is-
sues. (1) Does proﬁt-maximizing search maximize social welfare? (2) If not, how does it
diﬀerent from welfare-maximizing search? (3) At least, does it make society better-oﬀ?
To address these, we need clarify what we mean by “society”. In what follows, we
interpret both of inputs x1 and x2 as labor.
Assumption 11. Society is composed of a ﬁrm under consideration, its consumers and its
employees (the laborers of x1 and x2).
Assumption 12. Each commodity market has an identical representative consumer and
each labor market of xi has an identical representative laborer.
A representative consumer’s indirect utility and that of a representative laborer of xi
are denoted, respectively, by
vc(p) = vc(p, Ic) = max
y,z
u(y, z) subject to py + z = Ic,
vi(wi) = vi(wi, Ii, L) = max
z,xi
u(z, L− xi) subject to z = wixi + Ii, (25)
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where Ic and Ii are exogenous initial endowments of a consumer and a laborer of xi respec-
tively, z, a nume´raire and L, total time available to each laborer.6
Assumption 13. Social surplus is a sum of ﬁrm’s proﬁt and the indirect utility of its
consumers and employees.
Under these additional assumptions, social surplus is simply written as
π(λmp0, θmw0, w2) + vc(λmp0) + v1(θmw0) + v2(w2).
In this simpliﬁed setting, we discuss the welfare implications of simultaneous search.
6.1 The Welfare-Maximizing Simultaneous Search Problem
First, we formulate the problem of welfare-maximizing simultaneous search. The expected
social welfare net of search cost is written as
W (n;α) = H(n;α) +
∫ λ
λ
vc(λmp0)f
∗(λm|nλ) dλm +
∫ θ
θ
v1(θmw0)g
∗(θm|nθ) dθm. (26)
The problem of welfare-maximizing simultaneous search is to maximize (26) with respect
to n.
For technical reasons, we add two conventional assumptions on functions W , vc and vi.
Assumption 14. W (n, α) is twice diﬀerentiable in n and α.
Assumption 15. vc(·) and vi(·) are both diﬀerentiable in their arguments.
The next two propositions parallel Propositions 1 and 2. They characterize a socially
optimal intensity of simultaneous search.
Proposition 5. Suppose (9) holds. The welfare-maximizing search intensity n∗∗ = (n∗∗λ , n
∗∗
θ )
satisfies∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
π(λmp0, θmw0, w2)
∂f ∗(λm|nλ)
∂nλ
g∗(θm|nθ) dλm dθm = cλ−
∫ λ
λ
vc(λmp0)
∂f ∗(λm|nλ)
∂nλ
dλm,
(27)∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
π(λmp0, θmw0, w2)f
∗(λm|nλ)∂g
∗(θm|nθ)
∂nθ
dλm dθm = cθ−
∫ θ
θ
v1(θmw0)
∂g∗(θm|nθ)
∂nθ
dθm.
(28)
6It is noted here for later reference that we are imposing Walras’s law (or equality constraint) in each
maximization problem. One implication of this is that marginal utility of income is positive.
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Proof. For the interior solution, DW = 0 necessarily holds. These are just this rearranged.
Proposition 5 says that welfare-maximizing search equates marginal expected social
beneﬁt of search to its marginal expected social cost. The diﬀerence from Proposition 1
that characterizes proﬁt-maximizing search is that marginal expected costs of search now
include costs incurred by consumers and employees. It is noted that Corollaries 3 and 4 in
Appendix 2 imply ∫ λ
λ
vc(λmp0)
∂f ∗(λm|nλ)
∂nλ
dλm ≤ 0,∫ θ
θ
v1(θmw0)
∂g∗(θm|nθ)
∂nθ
dθm ≤ 0
since vc(·) is nonincreasing in λmp0 while v1(·) is nondecreasing in θmw0.
Proposition 6. (27) and (28) represent (local) welfare-maximizing search intensity if, at
n∗∗,∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
π(λmp0, θmw0, w2)
∂2f ∗(λm|nλ)
∂nλ2
g∗(θm|nθ) dλm dθm < −
∫ λ
λ
vc(λmp0)
∂2f ∗(λm|nλ)
∂nλ2
dλm,
(29)∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
π(λmp0, θmw0, w2)f
∗(λm|nλ)∂
2g∗(θm|nθ)
∂nθ2
dλm dθm < −
∫ θ
θ
v1(θmw0)
∂2g∗(θm|nθ)
∂nθ2
dθm,
(30)
and [∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
π(·)∂
2f ∗(λm|nλ)
∂nλ2
g∗(θm|nθ) dλm dθm +
∫ λ
λ
vc(λmp0)
∂2f ∗(λm|nλ)
∂nλ2
dλm
]
·
[∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
π(·)f∗(λm|nλ)∂
2g∗(θm|nθ)
∂nθ2
dλm dθm +
∫ θ
θ
v1(θmw0)
∂2g∗(θm|nθ)
∂nθ2
dθm
]
>
[∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
π(·)∂f
∗(λm|nλ)
∂nλ
∂g∗(θm|nθ)
∂nθ
dλm dθm
]2
. (31)
Further, if (29)-(31) are true for all n ∈ R2+, (27) and (28) give global maximum.
Proof. In Appendix 1.
Notice ﬁrst that none of these holds in general. For both of (29) and (30), Theorem 2
and Corollaries 2, 5 and 6 in Appendix 2 imply that the both sides of the inequalities may
be negative. For (31), the both sides may be positive.
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The economic meaning of these conditions is given as follows. (29) says that, in expec-
tation, ﬁrm’s marginal proﬁt must be more sensitive to search than consumer’s marginal
utility. Similarly, (30) states that, in expectation, ﬁrm’s marginal proﬁt must be more
sensitive to search than employee’s marginal utility. One possible interpretation for (31)
is that “own eﬀects” on marginal beneﬁts of search in society must outweigh their “cross
eﬀects” in society.
6.2 Social Sub-optimality of Firm’s Search
Suppose that (29)–(31) are all satisﬁed. Then, the next proposition answers our ﬁrst
question.
Proposition 7. Suppose that (9) and (29)–(31) hold. Then, profit-maximizing search does
not maximize social surplus.
Proof. In Appendix 1.
The next proposition exhibits how proﬁt-maximizing search diﬀers from welfare-maximizing
search.
Proposition 8. Suppose that (9) and (29)-(31) hold. Let n∗ and n∗∗ be intensities of profit-
maximizing search and welfare-maximizing search, respectively. Then, n∗ > n∗∗ holds.
Proof. In Appendix 1.
Proposition 8 states that whether it is for the lowest prices or the highest prices, a
proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm searches too much relative to social optimum.
6.3 Does Search Make Society Better-Oﬀ?
Search changes a resulting economy. Proposition 7 shows that ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximizing
search fails to maximize social welfare, but is it still worth doing for society?
An obvious measure for this argument is surplus diﬀerence between the two economies,
with and without search. If a ﬁrm chooses intensity n∗ > 0, then the expected social surplus
in this search economy is equal to W (n∗(α);α) in (26). In contrast, without search, social
surplus becomes
π(λp0, θw0, w2) + vc(λp0) + v1(θw0) + v2(w2).
In comparison, search is beneﬁcial if the surplus diﬀerence is positive, and is harmful if it
is negative.
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After rearrangement, this is to compare the ﬁrm’s proﬁt diﬀerence
ϕ(α)− π(λp0, θw0, w2) (32)
with the total utility diﬀerences of consumers and laborers
−
∫ λ
λ
vc(λmp0)f
∗(λm|nλ) dλm + vc(λp0) −
∫ θ
θ
v1(θmw0)g
∗(θm|nθ) dθm + v1(θw0). (33)
By the properties of π(·) and vj(·), both (32) and (33) are nonnegative. So, clearly, there
are conﬂicts between a ﬁrm and its customers and laborers.
While proﬁt is monetary, utility is a subjective measure. Hence, it is helpful, especially
in practice, to reexpress the utility diﬀerence in (33) in monetary scale. It is noted, however,
that utility theory is purely ordinal in nature and thus all we can do is approximation.
One useful tool for this purpose is Hicks’s equivalent variation (EV). To derive it, ﬁrst
rewrite consumer utility and laborer i’s utility by using indirect money metric function:
ec(p
′, vc(p)) = min
yˆ,zˆ
p′yˆ + zˆ subject to uc(yˆ, zˆ) = vc(p)
ei(vi(wi)) = min
zˆ,xˆi
zˆ subject to ui(zˆ, L− xˆi) = vi(wi)
where p and p′ are two diﬀerent prices of commodity y.
For consumer utility in economies with and without search, set p = λmp0 for an economy
with search and p = λp0 for an economy without search while setting p
′ = λp0 for both
economies to get
ec(λp0, vc(λmp0)) = λp0 yˆ(λp0, vc(λmp0)) + zˆ(λp0, vc(λmp0))
ec(λp0, vc(λp0)) = λp0 yˆ(λp0, vc(λp0)) + zˆ(λp0, vc(λp0)).
For laborer 1’s utility in economies with and without search, set w = θmw0 for an economy
with search and w = θw0 for an economy without search to have
e1(v1(θmw0)) = zˆ(v1(θmw0))
e1(v1(θw0)) = zˆ(v1(θw0)).
The expected EV for consumer, EVc, is obtained by taking the diﬀerence of the above ec’s
and then taking the expectation with respect to F ∗, so that
EVc =
∫ λ
λ
[λp0 yˆ(λp0, vc(λmp0)) + zˆ(λp0, vc(λmp0))] f
∗(λm|nλ) dλm
− λp0 yˆ(λp0, vc(λp0))− zˆ(λp0, vc(λp0)).
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Likewise, the expected EV for laborer 1, EV1 is derived by taking the diﬀerence of the
above e1’s and then taking the expectation with respect to G
∗, so that
EV1 =
∫ θ
θ
zˆ(v1(θmw0))g
∗(θm|nθ) dθm − zˆ(v1(θw0))
=
∫ θ
θ
θmw0 xˆ1(v1(θmw0))g
∗(θm|nθ) dθm − θw0 xˆ1(v1(θw0)),
where the last equality follows from the constraint in the original problem in (25). Applying
these, we summarize this discussion as follows.
Proposition 9. Suppose that (9) holds. Search is worth doing if ϕ(α)− π(λp0, θw0, w2) >
−EVc − EV1 holds.
7 Extensions and Limitations
In this paper, we analyzed a simultaneous ﬁxed-sample-size search problem of a competitive
ﬁrm. To conclude, we remark some extensions and limitations of the model presented in
this paper.
The model discussed above is based on several assumptions. While some are essential
assumptions to construct a ﬁrm’s search problem, others are rather for simplifying purposes.
For example, multiple-markets setting in Assumptions 2 and 3 are essential, but markets
need not be competitive if one condition explained below is satisﬁed.
Consider a monopolist. He faces a set of consumer markets, each of which has a well-
deﬁned, downward-sloping inverse demand function p(·) ∈ P where P represents a set
of inverse demand functions for commodity y in the economy. Furthermore, as before, he
knows the distribution of demand functions he faces (i.e., market types) and the frequencies,
but is ignorant of the exact location of any speciﬁc function. Let the rest of the setting
remain the same.
Begin with stage 2. The monopolist problem in this stage is production problem. That
is, given inverse demand p(·) ∈ P and input prices θw0 and w2, he maximizes direct
proﬁt p(y)y − c(y) with respect to y, where c(y) is the ﬁrm’s cost function for a ﬁxed y
such that
c(y) = c(θw0, w2, y) = min
x1,x2
θw0x1 + w2x2 subject to ζ(x1, x2) = y. (34)
Let y∗ be the monopolist’s optimal supply. Then, it necessarily satisﬁes
∂p(y)
∂y
y + p(y) =
∂c(y)
∂y
. (35)
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The argument minimum in (34) at y∗ gives the monopolist’s input demands x∗i . Substituting
these into the direct proﬁt yields indirect proﬁt π.
Go to stage 1. By conducting search of intensity n, a monopolist observes nλ inverse
demand functions, p1(·), p2(·), . . . , pnλ(·), and nθ discount factors, θ1, θ2, . . . , θnθ . Let i
and j be integers such that 1 ≤ i ≤ nλ and 1 ≤ j ≤ nθ. For each (pi(·), θj), he considers a
maximization problem such that
max
y
pi(y)y − c(θjw0, w2, y). (36)
Let y∗ij be the proﬁt-maximizing quantity supplied for this (pi(·), θj)-pair and let pij = pi(y∗ij)
be a selling price associated with this quantity. The monopolist’s indirect proﬁt π for this
pair (pi(·), θj) is then
πi j = pijy
∗
ij − c(θjw0, w2, y∗ij)
In case of n intensity of search, the monopolist obtains in total nλnθ indirect proﬁts to
compare.
Before going to search, he can compute y∗ij for each possible pair of (pi(·), θj). Fix θj
and consider a set P ′ = {pij ∈ R+ : i is such that pi(·) ∈ P}. Since pij ∈ P ′ is a real
number, we can place pi(·) in ascending order to construct an increasing sequence ⟨p(s)(·)⟩ =
⟨p(1)(·), p(2)(·), . . . , p(nλ)(·)⟩ for the ﬁxed θj. If ordering of pi(·) in ⟨p(s)(·)⟩ does not change
with θj, then this s successfully captures the proﬁtability of demand functions p(·) ∈ P ,
since π is nondecreasing in selling price. That is, in that case, if we let
π(s) j = p(s)(y
∗
ij)y
∗
ij − c(y∗ij),
then s satisﬁes π(s+1) j ≥ π(s),j for any j.
If the demand functions p(·) ∈ P can be ordered according to proﬁtability, then it holds
that for any intensity n
π∗ ≥ πi j for any i and j,
where π∗ is indirect proﬁt when the monopolist faces inverse demand function p(nλ)(·)
and discount factor θm. Therefore, it is clear that, out of nλ inverse demand functions,
p1(·), p2(·), . . . , pnλ(·), and nθ discount factors, θ1, θ2, . . . , θnθ , he chooses p(nλ) and θm. In
other words, the monopolist simply seeks the most proﬁtable consumer market for com-
modity y and the lowest input price for input x1. The monopolist’s objective function in
his search problem then becomes analogous to (5).
The key that enables us to use the simultaneous search model of a competitive ﬁrm
to a monopolist’s search is whether we can order diﬀerent demand functions faced by a
monopolist according to proﬁtability. If this condition fails, then our formulation presented
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is inappropriate since the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt function can no longer be written by using
pdf’s f ∗ and g∗ like before. If that condition still holds, then this approach remains useful
in studying the search behavior of monopolists and monopsonists.
Appendix 1
This appendix contains the proofs of Propositions 2, 3 and 6–8 in the text.
Proof of Proposition 2. The second-order suﬃcient condition for a relative maximum
is that the Hessian of H, D2H, is negative deﬁnite in some neighborhood of n∗. The
determinantal test for it is that every kth leading principal minor of |D2H| is positive if k
is even, and negative otherwise. D2H is[
Hnλnλ Hnλnθ
Hnθnλ Hnθnθ
]
,
where
Hnλnλ =
∂2E(π|nλ, nθ)
∂nλ2
=
∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
π(·)∂
2f ∗(λm|nλ)
∂nλ2
g∗(θm|nθ) dλm dθm, (37)
Hnλnθ = Hnθnλ =
∂2E(π|nλ, nθ)
∂nλ∂nθ
=
∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
π(·)∂f
∗(λm|nλ)
∂nλ
∂g∗(θm|nθ)
∂nθ
dλm dθm, (38)
and
Hnθnθ =
∂2E(π|nλ, nθ)
∂nθ2
=
∫ λ
λ
∫ θ
θ
π(·)f ∗(λm|nλ)∂
2g∗(θm|nθ)
∂nθ2
dλm dθm. (39)
The ﬁrst leading principal minors are (37) and (39). The determinantal test insists that
these be positive for n = n∗. Corollaries 5 and 6 in Appendix 2 imply that both of them
hold, since π(· ) is increasing in λmp0 and decreasing in θmw0, given Assumption 8.
The second principal minor is |D2H| = HnλnλHnθnθ − [Hnλnθ ]2. The above test insists
that it be positive for n = n∗. (9) is just this rearranged.
Global optimality follows if those respective conditions hold for all n.
Proof of Proposition 3. Here, we use the approach developed by Silberberg (1974).
The ﬁrm’s (original) problem is maxnH(n;α) as in (5). Here, n = (nλ, nθ) and α =
(cλ, cθ, p0, w0, w2). The “primal-dual” problem of this maximization problem is minn,a ϕ(α)−
H(n;α). The Lagrangean of this primal-dual problem is then
L(n, α) = ϕ(α)−H(n;α). (40)
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By construction, L(n∗, α) necessarily satisﬁes the ﬁrst- and second-order necessary con-
ditions for a minimum. They are
DL(n∗, α) =
[
Ln(n
∗, α) Lα(n∗, α)
]
=
[
Hn(n
∗;α) ϕα(α)−Hα(n∗, α)
] ≡ 0 (41)
D2L(n∗, α) =
[
Lnn(n
∗, α) Lnα(n∗, α)
Lαn(n
∗, α) Lαα(n∗, α)
]
is positive semideﬁnite. (42)
The latter condition (42) implies that its submatrix Lαα(n
∗, α) also satisﬁes the positive
semideﬁniteness.
Twice diﬀerentiating the both sides of (40) with respect to α gives
Lαα(n, α) = ϕαα(α)−Hαα(n, α).
But at a neighborhood of n∗, (41) ensures ϕα(α) ≡ Hα(n∗, α). Diﬀerentiate its both sides
with respect to α, yielding
ϕαα = Hαn(n
∗, α) · ∂n
∗
∂α
+Hαα.
By substitution, we obtain
Lαα = Hαn(n
∗, α) · ∂n
∗
∂α
.
From
Hα =
[
Hcλ Hcθ Hp0 Hw0 Hw2
]
=
[
−nλ −nθ ∂E(pi|n)∂(λmp0)λm
∂E(pi|n)
∂(θmw0)
θm
∂E(pi|n)
∂w2
]
,
each element of Hαn are calculated as
Hcλnλ = −1,
Hcλnθ = 0,
Hcθnλ = 0,
Hcθnθ = −1,
Hp0nλ =
∂2E(π|n)
∂(λmp0) ∂nλ
λm > 0,
Hp0nθ =
∂2E(π|n)
∂(λmp0) ∂nθ
λm = 0,
Hw0nλ =
∂2E(π|n)
∂(θmw0) ∂nλ
θm = 0,
Hw0nθ =
∂2E(π|n)
∂(θmw0) ∂nθ
θm > 0,
Hw2nλ =
∂2E(π|n)
∂w2 ∂nλ
= 0,
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Hw2nθ =
∂2E(π|n)
∂w2 ∂nθ
= 0.
Here, the signs of the last six elements follow from the theorems and corollaries in Ap-
pendix 2 and the Envelop Theorem. In matrix notation,
Hαn =

−1 0
0 −1
Hp0nλ 0
0 Hw0nθ
0 0
 .
So,
Lαα =

−∂n∗λ
∂cλ
−∂n∗λ
∂cθ
−∂n∗λ
∂p0
−∂n∗λ
∂w0
−∂n∗λ
∂w2
−∂n∗θ
∂cλ
−∂n∗θ
∂cθ
−∂n∗θ
∂p0
− ∂n∗θ
∂w0
− ∂n∗θ
∂w2
Hp0nλ
∂n∗λ
∂cλ
Hp0nλ
∂n∗λ
∂cθ
Hp0nλ
∂n∗λ
∂p0
Hp0nλ
∂n∗λ
∂w0
Hp0nλ
∂n∗λ
∂w2
Hw0nθ
∂n∗θ
∂cλ
Hw0nθ
∂n∗θ
∂cθ
Hw0nθ
∂n∗θ
∂p0
Hw0nθ
∂n∗θ
∂w0
Hw0nθ
∂n∗θ
∂w2
0 0 0 0 0
 . (43)
To establish parts (i) and (iv) of the proposition, note that the positive semideﬁniteness
of L∗αα implies that its ﬁrst leading principal minors are nonnegative. That is,
−∂n
∗
λ
∂cλ
≥ 0 =⇒ ∂n
∗
λ
∂cλ
≤ 0,
−∂n
∗
θ
∂cθ
≥ 0 =⇒ ∂n
∗
θ
∂cθ
≤ 0,
Hp0nλ
∂n∗λ
∂p0
≥ 0 =⇒ ∂n
∗
λ
∂p0
≥ 0,
Hw0nθ
∂n∗θ
∂w0
≥ 0 =⇒ ∂n
∗
θ
∂w0
≥ 0.
The last two inequalities are parts (i) and (iv) of the proposition.
By Young Theorem, D2L is symmetric. And so is Lαα. The symmetry of L
∗
αα implies
−∂n
∗
λ
∂cθ
= −∂n
∗
θ
∂cλ
=⇒ ∂n
∗
λ
∂cθ
=
∂n∗θ
∂cλ
, (44)
−∂n
∗
λ
∂w0
= Hw0nθ
∂n∗θ
∂cλ
=⇒ sign(∂n
∗
λ
∂w0
) = sign(−∂n
∗
θ
∂cλ
), (45)
−∂n
∗
θ
∂p0
= Hp0nλ
∂n∗λ
∂cθ
=⇒ sign(∂n
∗
θ
∂p0
) = sign(−∂n
∗
λ
∂cθ
), (46)
∂n∗λ
∂w2
= 0,
∂n∗θ
∂w2
= 0.
The last two equations are parts (v) and (vi).
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For the rest of the statement, we need look at entire D2L =
[
Lnn Lnα
Lαn Lαα
]
, where
L∗nn =
[−Hnλnλ −Hnλnθ
−Hnθnλ −Hnθnθ
]
,
L∗nα =
[−Hnλcλ −Hnλcλ −Hnλp0 −Hnλw0 −Hnλw2
−Hnθcλ −Hnθcλ −Hnθp0 −Hnθw0 −Hnθw2
]
= L∗αn
⊤.
By direct calculation, D2L is written as
−∂2E(pi|n)
∂n2λ
−∂2E(pi|n)
∂nλ∂nθ
1 0 − ∂2E(pi|n)
∂nλ∂(λmp0)
λm − ∂2E(pi|n)∂nλ∂(θmw0)θm −
∂2E(pi|n)
∂nλ∂w2
−∂2E(pi|n)
∂nθ∂nλ
−∂2E(pi|n)
∂n2θ
0 1 − ∂2E(pi|n)
∂nθ∂(λmp0)
λm − ∂2E(pi|n)∂nθ∂(θmw0)θm −
∂2E(pi|n)
∂nθ∂w2
1 0 −∂n∗λ
∂cλ
−∂n∗λ
∂cθ
0 0 0
0 1 −∂n∗θ
∂cλ
−∂n∗θ
∂cθ
0 0 0
− ∂2E(pi|n)
∂nλ∂(λmp0)
λm − ∂2E(pi|n)∂nθ∂(λmp0)λm 0 0 0 0 0
− ∂2E(pi|n)
∂nλ∂(θmw0)
θm − ∂2E(pi|n)∂nθ∂(θmw0)θm 0 0 0 0 0
−∂2E(pi|n)
∂nλ∂w2
−∂2E(pi|n)
∂nθ∂w2
0 0 0 0 0

.
The positive semideﬁniteness of D2L∗(n∗, α) ensures that all of its principal minors be
nonnegative. In particular, this implies that the following principal minors M ′2 and M
′′
2 are
nonnegative:
M ′2 =
�����−
∂2E(pi|n)
∂n2λ
1
1 −∂n∗λ
∂cλ
����� ≥ 0 =⇒ ∂n∗λ∂cλ ≤ 1∂2E(pi|n)
∂n2λ
, (47)
M ′′2 =
�����−
∂2E(pi|n)
∂n2θ
1
1 −∂n∗θ
∂cθ
����� ≥ 0 =⇒ ∂n∗θ∂cθ ≤ 1∂2E(pi|n)
∂n2θ
< 0
where M ′2 consists of D
2L’s ﬁrst and third rows and columns while M ′′2 consists of its
second and fourth rows and columns. Because π is increasing in λmp0 under Assumption 8,
Corollary 5 in Appendix 2 insists ∂
2E(pi|n)
∂n2λ
< 0. Applying this to the above inequalities
establishes parts (vii) and (viii).
Lastly, to show parts (ii), (iii), (ix) and (x), consider the following third principal
mninor M3
M3 =
�������
−∂2E[pi|n]
∂n2λ
1 0
1 −∂n∗λ
∂cλ
−∂n∗λ
∂cθ
0 −∂n∗θ
∂cλ
−∂n∗θ
∂cθ
������� ,
which consists of D2L’s ﬁrst, third and fourth rows and columns. The nonnegativity of M3
implies that
∂n∗θ
∂cθ
≥
[
∂n∗λ
∂cλ
∂n∗θ
∂cθ
− ∂n
∗
λ
∂cθ
∂n∗θ
∂cλ
]
∂2E(π|n)
∂n2λ
.
－ 76 －
Rearranging the terms and then applying (47) gives[
∂n∗λ
∂cλ
∂n∗θ
∂cθ
− ∂n
∗
λ
∂cθ
∂n∗θ
∂cλ
]
≥ ∂n
∗
θ
∂cθ
1
∂2E(pi|n)
∂n2λ
≥ ∂n
∗
θ
∂cθ
∂n∗λ
∂cλ
.
Together with (44), this proves parts (ix) and (x). Together with (45) and (46), this in
turn establishes parts (ii) and (iii).
Proof of Proposition 6. The second-order suﬃcient condition for a local (global) max-
imum is that the Hessian of W , D2W , is negative deﬁnite in some neighborhood of n∗∗
(for all n ∈ R2+ respectively). The determinantal test for this condition is that every kth
leading principal minor of |D2W | is positive if k is even, and negative otherwise. (29)-(31)
just restates these requirements.
Proof of Proposition 7. It suﬃces to show that n∗ ̸= n∗∗. By Propositions 1 and 5,
n∗λ = n
∗∗
λ holds if and only if Hnλ = Wnλ holds. From (7) and (27), the latter holds if and
only if ∫ λ
λ
vc(λmp0)
∂f ∗(λm|nλ)
∂nλ
dλm = 0.
Corollary 3 implies that this is the case if and only if vc is constant over p, or
∂vc(·)
∂(λmp0)
= 0,
since vc is nonincreasing in λmp0. However, it is not possible under the stated assumptions,
since together with Roy’s identity ∂vc(·)
∂(λmp0)
= 0 implies y∗ = 0 but Assumption 8 ensures y∗ >
0. The other claim, n∗θ ̸= n∗∗θ , can be established analogously.
Proof of Proposition 8. Under the stated conditions, n∗ and n∗∗ exist. We show n∗λm >
n∗∗λm . The proof of the other claim is similar. First, given Assumption 8, π increases in λmp0.
So, Corollary 5 implies that Hnλ decreases in nλ. Given (29), Wnλ decreases in nλ as well.
From Corollary 1 together with the above proof of Proposition 7, we have∫ λ
λ
vc(λmp0)
∂f ∗(λm|nλ)
∂nλ
dλm > 0.
So, Hnλ > Wnλ holds for any nλ. Both Hnλ and Wnλ are monotonic, and hence invertible.
Hence, H−1nλ (0) = n
∗
λ > n
∗∗
λ = W
−1
nλ
(0) follows.
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Appendix 2
In this appendix, we present six corollaries of Theorem 1 and 2 by Manning and Morgan
(1982), all of which are repeatedly referred to in the proof of the propositions as well as in
the text.
Let f ∗ be the pdf of the maximum of a sample of nx independent and identically
distributed observations from a population with pdf f and cdf F . Likewise, denote by g∗ the
pdf of the maximum of a sample of ny independent and identically distributed observations
from a population with pdf g and cdf G. Let us assume that both of the support of f and g
are reals R. Lastly, h is a diﬀerentiable function.
First, we replicate Theorem 1 and 2 by Manning and Morgan (1982) for reference.
Theorem 1. ∫
R
h(y)
∂g∗(y|ny)
∂ny
dy ⋛ 0, as dh
dy
⋚ 0, for all y∈ R. (48)
Theorem 2. ∫
R
h(y)
∂2g∗(y|ny)
∂ny2
dy ⋛ 0, as dh
dy
⋛ 0, for all y∈ R.
The next two corollaries are maximum counterpart of these theorems.
Corollary 1. ∫
R
h(x)
∂f ∗(x|nx)
∂nx
dx ⋛ 0, as dh
dx
⋛ 0, for all x∈ R.
Proof. From (3),
∂f ∗(x|nx)
∂nx
= [1 + nx lnF (x)]F (x)
nx−1f(x). (49)
There exists a unique x = r such that
1 + nx lnF (x) ⋚ 0 as x ⋚ r,
since f is a pdf. Thus,
∂f∗(x|nx)
∂nx
⋚ 0 as x ⋚ r.
Suppose that dh
dx
> 0 for all x ∈ R. Then h(x) ⋚ h(r) when x ⋚ r, and∫
R
h(x)
∂f ∗(x|nx)
∂nx
dx =
∫ r
h(x)
∂f ∗(x|nx)
∂nx
dx +
∫
r
h(x)
∂f ∗(x|nx)
∂nx
dx
>
∫ r
h(r)
∂f ∗(x|nx)
∂nx
dx +
∫
r
h(r, y)
∂f ∗(x|nx)
∂nx
dx
= h(r)
∫
R
∂f ∗(x|nx)
∂nx
dx = 0
since f ∗ is a pdf. A similar argument applies if dh
dx
≤ 0.
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Corollary 2. ∫
R2
h(x)
∂2f ∗(x|nx)
∂nx2
dx ⋛ 0, as dh
dx
⋚ 0, for all x∈ R.
Proof. From (49),
∂2f ∗(x|nx)
∂nx2
= [2 + nx lnF (x)]F (x)
nx−1 lnF (x)f(x).
Since f is a pdf, there is a unique x = r′ such that
2 + nx lnF (x) ⋛ 0 as x ⋚ r′.
Thus,
∂f ∗(x|nx)
∂nx
⋚ 0 as x ⋚ r′.
Proceeding as in Corollary 1 completes the proof.
From the above four theorems and corollaries, the next statements are immediate.
Corollary 3.∫∫
R2
h(x, y)
∂f ∗(x|nx)
∂nx
g∗(y|ny) dx dy ⋛ 0, as ∂h
∂x
⋛ 0, for all (x, y)∈ R2.
Proof. Corollary 1 implies that, ﬁxing y∈ R,∫
R
h(x, y)
∂f ∗(y|nx
∂nx
dx ⋛ 0, as ∂h
∂x
⋛ 0, for all (x, y)∈ R2.
Integrate over y, resulting the claim.
Corollary 4.∫∫
R2
h(x, y)f ∗(x|nx)∂g
∗(y|ny)
∂ny
dx dy ⋛ 0, as ∂h
∂y
⋚ 0, for all (x, y)∈ R2.
Proof. Theorem 1 implies that, ﬁxing x ∈ R,∫
R
h(x, y)
∂g∗(y|ny)
∂ny
dy ⋛ 0, as ∂h
∂y
⋚ 0, for all y∈ R.
Integrate over x, resulting the claim.
Corollary 5.∫∫
R2
h(x, y)
∂2f ∗(x|nx)
∂nx2
g∗(y|ny) dx dy ⋛ 0, as ∂h
∂x
⋚ 0, for all (x, y)∈ R2.
－ 79 －
Proof. Corollary 2 implies that, ﬁxing y∈ R,∫
R
h(x, y)
∂2f ∗(y|nx
∂nx2
dx ⋛ 0, as ∂h
∂x
⋚ 0, for all (x, y)∈ R2.
Integrate over y, resulting the claim.
Corollary 6.∫∫
R2
h(x, y)f ∗(x|nx)∂
2g∗(y|ny)
∂ny2
dx dy ⋛ 0, as ∂h
∂y
⋛ 0, for all (x, y)∈ R2.
Proof. Theorem 2 implies that, ﬁxing x ∈ R∫
R
h(x, y)
∂2g∗(y|ny)
∂ny2
dy ⋛ 0, as ∂h
∂y
⋛ 0, for all y∈ R.
Integrate over x, resulting the claim.
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